

are arguments to such conclusions, of course, but it is not clear where Nolan stands on those arguments.

Despite these reservations, *Cognitive Practices* strikes me as on the money in raising penetrating and far-reaching criticisms of prevailing views in philosophy and cognitive science. The book is well-written, original, and often exciting. Let us hope for a sequel, *Cognitive Practices II*, in which the details are spelled out.

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PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

Consciousness

Edited by MARTIN DAVIES and GLYN W. HUMPHREYS

Blackwell, 1993. x + 312 pp. £40.00 cloth, £14.99 paper

This collection of papers, partly drawn from *Mind and Language*, gives a clear idea of the current state of research into consciousness. After a fine introduction by the editors, there are five psychological essays by Eyal Reingold and Philip Merikle, Andrew Young and Edward de Haan, Colleen Kelley and Larry Jacoby, Keith Oatley, and Cecilia Heyes and Anthony Dickinson, and eight philosophical essays by Joseph Levine, Robert van Gulick, Colin McGinn, John Biro, David Rosenthal, Norton Nelkin, Georges Rey and Kathleen Akins. The second psychological essay reviews experimental work on blindsight, visual extinction, neglect, prosopagnosia and the first discusses the methodological issues that arise in such work. Together with a paper on the subjective experience of memory, these are probably of most interest to philosophers working on consciousness. However, there is also a rather stylised essay on Freud's therapeutic practice and an essay on the ascription of intentional states to animals. The philosophical essays predictably enough focus on the work of Thomas Nagel and Frank Jackson. Perhaps inevitably there is a fair bit of repetition but the interdisciplinary approach does provide a welcome variety of insights and it is in this regard that the collection is important.

Nevertheless, it is also in this regard that one might be occasionally disappointed. For instance, Reingold and Merikle argue that subjects' reports of whether they are aware of a certain stimulus are problematic criteria of consciousness because "it is difficult to know what criteria individuals use to decide that they are [merely] guessing" (p. 48). Therefore Reingold and Merikle offer two alternatives (pp. 52-7). Consider now Rosenthal's claim that a subject's mental state is conscious if it is accompanied by a higher order thought that he or she is in that very mental state. This claim suggests that Rosenthal does not agree with Reingold and Merikle's reservation which, one would think, applies as much to the link between a mental state and a thought about it, as to a mental state and a report about it. The suggestion is reinforced by the fact that Rosenthal writes "if the mental state is conscious, one will be aware of it and hence be able to report that one is in it" (p. 204). Even in this book, one still sometimes gets the impression

that an 'interdisciplinary' approach just means that two disciplines are working on a single problem.

Part of the divide probably arises from a difference of emphasis. Roughly speaking, psychologists tend to focus on what consciousness does for us (p. 5), philosophers on what it is. It is conceivable that they are interested in different things. Still, certain philosophers do make the effort to learn from the work of psychologists. Norton Nelkin uses, amongst other things, cases of blindsight to distinguish between intentional, phenomenal and introspective states. He notes that blindsight patients cannot introspect what they perceive in the blind part of their visual field, yet, he argues, the best explanation of their ability to guess correctly what has been presented is that they have an intentional state representing it. One apparent problem for Nelkin's position is describing what introspection is. Nelkin denies that introspection is always accompanied by some kind of phenomenology, (pp. 233–5). In which case, it is not clear why the patient's ability to correctly guess does not count as introspection, contrary to what Nelkin supposes (pp. 228–9).

In contrast, both van Gulick and Akins attempt to illuminate our understanding of phenomenal consciousness by emphasising its close connection with representation. For van Gulick its function is to make available a certain kind of representation. Thus he writes "Conscious experience involves more than just being in states that represent or refer to objects and their properties . . . it involves their *being* a world of objects *inherent* in the representation" (p. 150). To defend a functional approach to the nature of consciousness, van Gulick recognises that he needs to identify something that consciousness alone can do (pp. 146–7). So, by his lights, his claim that "Sensuous manifolds provide a medium well suited for the representation of such rich and easily accessed spatiotemporal information" (p. 152) falls short of a successful defence. As he admits, it leaves open the possibility that such representation could have been achieved another way (pp. 152, 154). It is however, an interesting line to pursue.

Akins argues that since it is not possible to distinguish between an experience's pure phenomenal features and its representational features, "we do not know, *a priori*, what insights . . . will result from empirical investigation" (p. 270). Perhaps we don't, but one gets the impression that she believes that the inseparability of phenomenology from conscious representation also alleviates some of the problems that we feel attach to scientific investigation of phenomenology (p. 270). This is more debatable. It might make research into phenomenology more tractable but it might very well make research into conscious representation as intractable.

John Biro criticises Nagel for presuming that since bats have different sensory apparatus to us, they have different sense experiences. Biro supposes that such an argument relies upon there being psycho-physical laws whose existence an anti-reductionist such as Nagel is committed to deny (p. 185). But this seems wrong. First, it is perfectly legitimate for an anti-reductionist to assume with the reductionist that there are psycho-physical laws and show that there still is a problem for the reductionist position. Second, when Nagel concludes that there is an irreducible subjective aspect to our experiences he does not deny the existence of psycho-physical laws. What he denies is that subjective properties can be understood in terms of neural properties.

A virtue of this collection of essays is that not only does it provide the interdisciplinary basis for future work on consciousness, but it also makes progress seem possible. Given the difficulty of the problems, that is no mean achievement.

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The Mind and its Depths

By RICHARD WOLLHEIM

Harvard University Press, 1993. x + 214 pp. \$24.95

The depths explored and assessed in Richard Wollheim's collection of twelve essays from the years 1975–1989 are principally those of morality, psychoanalysis and visual art. In the first and third domains, the pieces capture Wollheim's delight in free intellectual movement and elegant turns of thought to place and surpass rival views. A splendid example of this is his reasoned rejection of the "assimilation of pictorial to linguistic meaning", an error which he considers "unites structuralism, post-structuralism, deconstruction, hermeneutics, . . . 'mainstream' semiotics, and certain versions of cognitive science" (p. 185). His reassessment of Mill's thought in terms of a sophisticated adherence to the principle of utility (pp. 22–38) and his appreciation of Bradley's central notion of "moral volition" as drawing together philosophy and developmental psychology (pp. 39–52) show a similar delicacy of judgement and argumentative richness. Depth and complexity emerge together as characteristic and intelligible features of ourselves as moral beings.

A theme running through the collection is the relationship between philosophy and psychology. As in the discussion of Bradley, these disciplines can form a partnership, with the purposes of one being furthered by collaboration with the other. In other cases, the possibility of right judgement in philosophy depends on our recognition that we are beings with a psychology and that our psychology, even if materially based, involves intentionality (states with contents) and subjectivity (what it is like for the subject). With regard to visual works of art, this phenomenological psychology allows room for us to make sense of recognising in the work matters not available through mere scrutiny of its marked surface. Wollheim's 'seeing in' thus displaces a more primitive notion of seeing from the centre of critical theory.

Any student of Wollheim's work knows that within psychology he believes there to be a special place for psychoanalysis, especially the work of Freud and Melanie Klein. Unlike Wittgenstein, he sees psychoanalysis as extending rather than replacing ordinary conceptions of psychology and psychological causation. He argues that Freudian theory must be seen against the background of our ordinary understanding of thought and action, although it produces not only new phenomena and new concepts, but also new kinds of concepts with distinctive kinds of causality. Central examples of these are the concepts of defence mechanisms: projection, introjection, and projective identification and concepts of a diversity of Kleinian internal objects. With its extended array of concepts and explanations, psychoanalysis can provide