If I have one quibble with Gascoigne's book (and this is a counsel of perfection), then it is that at no point do we hear the author's voice amid the critical discussion of the main anti-sceptical responses. Given that this is an introductory text this is perfectly understandable, but it does leave one with a certain pessimism by the end. Is it true that *all* of these anti-sceptical proposals are fatally flawed, and all fatally flawed to the same extent? Indeed, one would have liked to have at least heard in which general direction Gascoigne thought the answer to scepticism lay, even if he himself declined to develop a particular anti-sceptical line. As it stands, then, what we have is an excellent handbook for would-be sceptics, with the emphasis on the word 'excellent'.

THE UNIVERSITY OF STIRLING DUNCAN PRITCHARD

PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

Other Minds
By ANITA AVRAMIDES
Routledge, 2001. xvi + 334 pp. £45.00 cloth, £15.99 paper

On Avramides's account, the problem of other minds arises as a consequence of the Cartesian epistemological project. In contrast to classical scepticism, the introduction of the 'demon' doubt allows for a form of scepticism that drives a wedge between appearance and reality. Given this, it can no longer be taken that experience presents one with awareness of anything external to oneself. All that one is immediately aware of are one's ideas—there is no necessary connection between the having of subjective experience and the existence of an objective reality. Once this model of experience is in place, the problem of other minds becomes an epistemological problem: how can one come to know whether another has a mind?

Avramides rejects the claim that the problem of other minds is fundamentally epistemological. Instead, it is at core a conceptual issue. Drawing support from Wittgenstein, Strawson, and Davidson, she argues that once we have given a satisfactory account of the mind, the epistemological issue becomes unproblematic. The existence of other minds is built into the concept of mind from the outset.

In keeping with the Problems of Philosophy series, the book has two main threads. Parts One and Two concern the historical development of the problem of other minds. In the first, the problem is attributed to the ideal theory, and the source of the standard reply, the argument from analogy, is traced. Rejecting the claim that this argument is advocated by Descartes and Locke, Avramides first finds evidence of it in the work of Arnauld. There is also a stimulating discussion of Malebranche's account of our knowledge of other minds, this filling a gap in the current literature.

Part Two continues the historical theme by focusing on those philosophers rejecting the ideal theory. Thomas Reid's common-sense alternative is discussed. Reid advocates a form of direct realism, leaving no room for

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scepticism about the external world to get hold. His account does, however, leave space for scepticism about other minds, and it is to Wittgenstein's work that Avramides looks for the first substantial attempt to undermine the sceptic.

The third part contains Avramides's positive account, and endeavours to defend it against criticism from the likes of Nagel and Stroud. The account builds on the Wittgensteinian insight, and attempts to marry the work of Strawson and Davidson. Avramides suggests that it is only by focusing on the issue of what allows us to possess a concept of mind that is general in its application—that can be applied to both oneself and others—that we can undermine scepticism. The "lived position" (p. 229)—the pre-philosophical view that the attribution of mental states to others is unproblematic—should be our starting point. What we have to do is ask what makes this stance possible. Interaction with others is the suggested answer. This approach, it is suggested, will undermine the sceptic's starting point, as once the Cartesian assumption that psychological terms get their meaning through introspective awareness is made, there is no way to make sense of the suggestion that others might also have mental states.

The book is a major contribution to the literature on other minds. The historical material is first rate, although it occasionally appears as if it is scepticism about the external world that is the main subject (this, after all, is what Reid is taken to defeat), and there is remarkably little on Hume or Kant. The positive theory is interesting and appealing, if painted in rather broad strokes. It is not clear that Avramides's theory fully meets the sceptical challenge—it does, however, provide a stimulating starting point for further work.

THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW — CHRIS LINDSAY

Soul, Body, and Survival. Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons
Edited by KEVIN CORCORAN
Cornell University Press, 2001. x + 252 pp. $45.00 cloth, $19.95 paper

This is a good collection. The selections are interesting both individually and collectively, and if the standard of rigour in them varies somewhat that is unsurprising, given the subject. However, all the papers are of philosophical interest, and collectively they reveal the considerable range that discussions of souls and survival currently involve. The editor, Kevin Corcoran, has divided the essays into three sections, 'Cartesian Dualism', 'Alternatives to Cartesian Dualism', and 'Does Life after Death Require Dualism?'.

These sections contain, respectively:

John Foster, 'A Brief Defense of the Cartesian View'; Jaegwon Kim, 'Lonely Souls: Causality and Substance Dualism'; Timothy O'Connor, 'Causality Mind, and Free Will'; Charles Taliaferro, 'Emergentism and Consciousness: Going beyond Property Dualism'; Eric T. Olson, 'A Compound of Two Substances'; Stewart Goetz, 'Modal Dualism: A Critique'.

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William Hasker, 'Persons as Emergent Substances'; Brian Leftow, 'Souls Dipped in Dust'; E. J. Lowe, 'Identity, Composition, and the Simplicity of the Self'; Lynne Baker, 'Materialism with a Human Face';

Trenton Merricks, 'How to Live Forever without Saving Your Soul: Physicalism and Immortality'; Kevin Corcoran, 'Physical Persons and Postmortem Survival without Temporal Gaps'; John Cooper, 'Biblical Anthropology and the Body-Soul Problem'; Stephen T. Davis, 'Physicalism and Resurrection'.

In his introduction—more helpful and interesting than many introductions—Corcoran suggests, optimistically perhaps, that "dualism is making a comeback" (p. 2), and this collection attests to its continuing philosophical provocativeness: no one author agrees whole-heartedly with any one of the others.

Perhaps the sharpest paper in the volume is Jaegwon Kim's 'Lonely Souls' which points out a number of difficulties facing substance dualists who turn their attention to causal matters. 'Lonely Souls' has already, prior to publication, attracted a good deal of attention, and in this collection there is a reply by Timothy O'Connor opting for "property emergentism" as a way not so much of answering, as of evading, Kim's points.

The problem of the 'emergence' of consciousness receives a divine solution in both Taliaferro and Foster, with Taliaferro opting for "sustained, ongoing Divine interventions" (p. 70) and Foster choosing "the creative role of God" (p. 29).

An outstanding problem with substance dualism ("the most widely held position among the untutored"—Taliaferro (p. 60)), highlighted by Locke, remains undealt with here. "Pray tell us," he wrote in the margin of Thomas Burnet's attack on the *Essay*, "how you conceive cogitation in an unsolid created substance. It is as hard, I confess, to me to be conceived in an unsolid as in a solid substance."

The soul discussed in the papers is by and large Cartesian, but Brian Leftow considers the Aristotelian/Thomistic alternative, though space does not allow him to deal with the various distinct difficulties that this notion of soul involves.

With the exception of the pieces by Baker and Lowe there is, throughout, little mention of non-human animals, though many of the pieces would benefit from at least a glance at other animals. Lowe argues for the simplicity of the self on the basis of a set of premises (subsequently argued for) that includes "I am not identical with my body" (p. 139). For someone who accepts his premises and his defence of them, it seems to follow that *all* animals, and not just human animals, have simple selves, but this conclusion is not explicitly drawn.

Apart from Lowe's piece, there is no formal material in the collection, though Trenton Merricks's suggestion that we drop identity criteria immediately raises wonders about the logic of identity with which he is implicitly working. In informal terms Davis looks at this problem on pp. 232–5 of his piece.

The index is welcome but strikingly incomplete.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY J.J. MACINTOSH

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Functions in Mind. A Theory of Intentional Content
By CAROLYN PRICE
Clarendon Press, 2001. x + 264 pp. £35.00

Carolyn Price's book is an interesting exploration of one way in which appeal to functions might be pressed into service to provide an account of intentional content. She begins with the thought that explanations citing beliefs and desires ('intentional explanations') identify natural entities and yet have a normative ring (pp. 1–2). Such explanations seek to make sense of an agent's actions. Price appeals to biological functions to elucidate this feature (p. 4). She adjudicates between the various accounts of function on the market by considering the extent to which they can satisfactorily capture the combination of causal explanatoriness and normativity (p. 3). Dispositional theories of function cannot capture the explanatory value of normativity in intentional explanations (p. 24). Simple aetiological theories are committed to implausible attributions of functions, for instance, to clay crystals slowing water thereby encouraging a further layer to be deposited (pp. 32, 59–60). Price advances her own theory appealing to the idea of *preservation through service*. The key idea is that x has a function to do A if an x's doing A for a G explains why g produced x (p. 36). Her theory is different from Millikan's in that there is no essential appeal to natural selection (p. 40). Although, by her lights, her theory avoids some of the problems of previous theories, it does not do much better capturing the normativity of intentional explanation. This leads her to conclude that it derives from the metaphor of social obligation (pp. 42–47, 251).

As Price notes, the formulation of her idea of preservation through service by itself fails to yield the proper attributions of functions. Additional constraints are needed. The constraints are immediacy of explanation, independence from the workings of other elements and abstractness from design features (pp. 58–69). She argues that they allow us to arrive at the appropriate verdict in the clay crystal case mentioned. She also appeals to these constraints to deal with one of the substantial objections to teleological theories of content: indeterminacy. Frogs' visual system represents flies (= catchable item having just those biochemical properties that make flies nutritious to frogs) rather than small dark objects because this provides the most abstract and immediate explanation of why frogs have the visual system they do and have reproduced and survived (pp. 110, 116). She addresses Peacocke's worry that her type of teleological theory of content is unable to license the attribution of contents concerning the inaccessible. She argues that general purpose intentional systems (and only such systems) would have the capacity to think about inaccessible places. The basic idea is that such subjects can benefit from the idea that their perceptual experience is caused by things which need not have. She also notes that, in order to get determinate assignments of content for general purpose systems the appeal to constraints alone won't work. General purpose systems don't have sufficiently discriminatory functions. So she appeals to the rules which govern the normal working of these systems to differentiate between the various possible attributions of content (p. 239).

THE UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM PAUL NOORDHOF

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