

lines of a belief that *p*, or a desire that *q*. Rather, they are better construed as parts of a general approach to life that underlies our beliefs and desires. However, if commitments are not propositional attitudes at all, I fail to see how they challenge the claim of a clear-cut distinction *within* propositional attitudes, namely beliefs and desires.

Many analytically trained philosophers suspect that something is missing in mainstream philosophy of mind, and would like to investigate the phenomenological tradition. Such philosophers face formidable obstacles, both stylistic and substantive. What they need is a book by someone with a strong grounding in both traditions, and who can explain phenomenology in a way that is accessible to analytic philosophers, and reveal its relevance to their own projects. Ratcliffe has written such a book.

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## ETHICS

*The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value*

By ROBERT AUDI

Princeton University Press, 2004. xii + 244 pp. £22.95

Robert Audi's book is an innovative work of integration. He defends a version of ethical intuitionism, most famously propounded by W.D. Ross. Its key move is to argue for a plurality of fundamental and self-evident principles concerning our prima facie duties which, at the same time, receive support from a unifying principle which he takes to be Kant's categorical imperative. Much of the work is done by Audi's scrutiny and relaxation of the idea of self-evidence. According to Audi, a principle is softly self-evident if (amongst other things) it can be defeasibly known independently of premises (p. 53). This allows for the possibility of an empirical intuitionism based upon the (reliable) perception of moral properties and a rationalist intuitionism (supported by Audi) rooted, he supposes, in our conceptual understanding. With self-evidence understood in this way, it is not clear that the standard characterization of ethical intuitionism—that there is a plurality of basic non-inferentially knowable moral principles—serves to distinguish it from single principle moral theories. For example, is anybody who supposes that principles of prima facie duties are heuristics useful for working out what we ought to do committed to denying that they may be known independently of premises? A decent moral education which did not seek to develop things too deeply may provide its recipients with such knowledge without any commitment as to whether there is a single principle of morality, no principles at all (as ethical particularists recommend), or something in between as ethical intuitionists have been taken to argue.

For this reason, the really important work of the book seems to me to lie in Audi's discussion of the way in which the principles concerning prima facie duties may be fundamental and the kind of support that Kant's categorical imperative may give them. In addition to self-evidence, the principles are purportedly fundamental because their normative force does not derive from

indicating some other factor (such as pleasure) and we can be more justified in believing them than in some fundamental principle (p. 104). The second feature does not seem hard to satisfy. There are many reasons—for instance, lack of intellectual capacity or prior to theorizing (as Audi acknowledges)—that might result in our being more justified in believing the *prima facie* duty statements than some more fundamental principle. So the substantial question is how can principles receive support from a more fundamental principle and yet not derive their normative force from the features of reality identified by it? For instance, suppose that the *prima facie* duties were all supported by the principle of utility. Then it would seem that, whatever features they identified, they would involve conduciveness to utility maximization.

Audi's answer seems to trade on what many of those unsympathetic to the Kantian tradition in ethics have proclaimed as a flaw in the categorical imperative: its vagueness or emptiness. He considers, first, the universality formulation: act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature (p. 90). The standard difficulty arises over the proper formulation of the maxim. Almost anything is allowed given enough detail. In Audi's hands, though, this formulation of the categorical imperative becomes a means of testing how one should resolve conflicts between principles of *prima facie* duties. For example, should one break a promise to meet a friend to look after one's sick daughter (p. 91)? Taken in isolation, it is unclear how this formulation can help, as Audi recognizes. Take any conflict between the *prima facie* duty of beneficence and one like that of promise-keeping. Then there will almost always be a way of specifying a principle so that we would not be permitted to keep our promises rather than maximize beneficence.

Thus, Audi places the emphasis on the intrinsic end formulation: act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means but always at the same time as an end (p. 90). Failure to tend one's daughter would not treat her as an end whereas breaking the promise would not be failing to treat the friend as an end (it would not be *using* the friend at all). Such reasoning reveals how Audi sees the role of the categorical imperative. We have intuitions about how to treat people as ends which are articulated in the *prima facie* duties and, thereby, supply the raw materials for an analysis of the intuitive notion of treating somebody as an end. The intrinsic end formulation thus justifies the principles in the sense that it explains what they are meant to capture while at the same time suggesting how we should weigh one principle against another when they conflict (p. 103). They are essential because, as things stand, the intrinsic end formulation is, at best, too vague to provide guidance and, since it is vague, the principles of *prima facie* duties do not simply point to the normative force that it supplies.

I am no doubt not alone in thinking that this is a difficult balancing act. Suppose the point is that the intrinsic end formulation is neutral between a range of different ways in which we could treat people as ends. The principles of *prima facie* duties just serve to specify which way of treating people as ends we should have in mind. Then their normative force is derived from treating

people as end. It is just that the intrinsic ends formulation obscures this by failing to make clear which way of treating people as ends to have in mind. Suppose, instead, that the whole idea of treating people as ends is vague in the following sense. There can be a number of equally good precisifications. Then it seems right that one set of principles of prima facie duties rather than another do not derive their normative force from the intrinsic end formulation. However, it is hard to see how, in those circumstances, the Kantian principle can serve to justify one set over another. At best, the intrinsic end formulation demarcates a broad territory and proclaims that sets of principles which fall outside that territory should not be counted.

In Audi's hands, it seems fair to say, the intrinsic ends formulation is taken to support treating other people with great dignity (and this meshes with Audi's laudable aim of explaining how prima facie duties can be rooted in the good). Even the manner of one's treatment becomes a matter of prima facie duty (and here Audi presents an advance over Ross's formulation of prima facie duties): a duty of respectfulness (p. 195). There seems to be little moral room for rough treatment between individuals: the challenging, irascible, critical and disrespectful all fail to live up to the intrinsic end formulation so understood. It is questionable whether morality should be extended that far and underpin what may turn out to be exacting requirements for courtesy. That is not to say that there is no standard to which such characters fail to live up to but simply that it is far from clear that this standard should be understood as a prima facie duty as opposed, perhaps, to a certain kind of ideal.

As I noted earlier, for Audi, the principles of prima facie duties are conceptual truths. He rejects the idea that they are empirical on the grounds that anybody who denied that there was a prima facie duty not to injure (say) would display a kind of moral deafness (p. 67). There are different kinds of deafness however. A subject may be alive to the morally significant features of injury and yet question whether they should always have the moral significance that Audi takes them to have (that is, to be the basis of a prima facie duty). It is unclear that such a subject is making a conceptual mistake. This concern seems particularly appropriate given that, for Audi, recognizing prima facie duties is not related to motivation (pp. 67–68). Those who see a tighter link between morality and motivation may well choose to characterize the nature of the moral deafness to which Audi points in a different way.

It is certainly the case that, for subjects who grasped the fully articulate conception of human dignity and treating people as ends Audi recommends, Audi's prima facie duties would a priori. What is less clear is that we demand that everyday masters of the concepts that Audi uses to formulate his principles of prima facie duty—and indeed masters of the concepts related to Kant's intrinsic end formulation—should be able to, simply by such grasp, arrive a priori at the principles Audi recommends. It may be helpful to distinguish between knowledge that is readily available due to a mix of conceptual mastery and everyday experience of the nature of human existence, and knowledge which is genuinely a priori. The more detailed and less obvious developments of Audi's position are more plausibly thought of in terms of the former.

I hope that the preceding has given some indication of the exceptional interest of the questions raised by Audi in this book along with the suggestiveness of his answers. I should indicate, however, that there are important dimensions of the work I have been unable to discuss in a review of this scope including his theory of value (Ch. 4), and discussion of particularism and the work of previous ethical intuitionists (Chs. 1, 2.5, 5). There is a lot more to learn from it.

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*The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability*

By STEPHEN DARWALL

Harvard University Press, 2006. xiv + 348 pp. £32.95

Having been sent this book by the Editor I have been under an obligation to review it. This is not because the world would have been a worse place had I not done so—on that it is not for me to judge—but because I am accountable to him for delivering a review. As a former reviews editor myself I can empathize with his resentment at non-compliance and so I do as I would be done by. This is the sort of model Stephen Darwall takes for obligation generally and moral obligation in particular, reliant, as mention of resentment should suggest, on Strawson's account but going well beyond his anti-consequentialism in its conclusion that morality is irreducibly a matter of our interpersonal relationships as members of the moral community.

There are, Darwall observes, distinctively second-personal reasons for action, in that they are grounded in the authority which the person who addresses them to an agent has over him in virtue of their relationship, and whereby the addressee is accountable to her, the addresser of the reasons. Morality is built on such reasons, since "the inviolable value or *dignity* of persons has an irreducibly second-personal element which includes the authority to demand certain treatment of each other, like not stepping on one another's feet" (p. 13).

What Darwall calls "Strawson's Point" is that the desirability of an action is a reason of the wrong sort for holding someone accountable, as against having the authority to make a claim on him. "Fichte's Point" is that a second-personal claim presupposes "a mutual second-personality that addresser and addressee share and that is appropriately recognised reciprocally" (p. 20), so that each can regulate their conduct by second-personal reasons. To get someone to so act is thus fundamentally different from coercing them, for, on "Fichte's Analysis", as Darwall puts it, second personal address gets them to act of their own free will. "Pufendorf's Point" is finally marshalled to establish that obligations can be ascribed only to those who can "hold themselves responsible by self-addressed demands from a perspective that we and they share" (p. 122), namely the second-personal perspective involved in making and recognizing claims on each other's conduct—a perspective we possess as free and rational members of the moral community.

These are the eclectic materials Darwall brings to bear in arguing for the irreducibly second-personal character of morality. Each is, of course, developed and defended at some length. Thus Darwall generalizes Strawson's