More in pain …

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In his response, Michael Tye writes as if I reject Representationalism about pain. But in my original paper (Noordhof 2001) I hoped to make clear that I did not. For instance, I remarked that I had sympathy with the position (95) and, on the subsequent page, outlined what I thought the Representationalist should say. My proposal was that when we experience a pain in the finger, the experience is veridical only if the cause of this experience is a disordered state of the finger. My appeal to the notion of a state was not made with any ambitions for ontological reduction (e.g. denying that there are pains but only states of having pain). So I’m afraid that Tye’s objections deriving from attributing to me such a view and pointing out that Representationalism is needed to capture, amongst other things, the fact that we experience pains in phantom limbs are all beside the point.

Instead, the question is entirely a matter of whether the inferences mentioned in my original paper and Tye’s reply fail because, although the ‘in’ of ‘pain in X’, is simply that of spatial location, the representational character of experiences of pain creates an intensional context. My point was that, in the cases described, we don’t have mere intensional differences but a difference in extension. In a nutshell, my claim was that if Tye were right, then

(3) The pain is in my mouth

should be true when my throbbing finger is in my mouth. But it’s not. In his response, Tye suggests that this is because there are two spatial senses of ‘in’. So, Representationalism by his lights retains the virtue of keeping
the ‘in’ of ‘pain in X’ spatial although matters appear a little more complicated than they did originally. I invite Tye to consider whether we need to add to the kind of spatial senses of ‘in’ to say what is wrong in the following invalid inferences.

(A1) There is a poisonous gas in the spacecraft.
(A2) The spacecraft is in the earth’s atmosphere.

Therefore,

(A3) There is a poisonous gas in the earth’s atmosphere.

(B1) There is a flaw in the diamond.
(B2) The diamond is in the box.

Therefore,

(B3) There is a flaw in the box.

(C1) There is a tremor in my hand.
(C2) My hand is in my pocket.

Therefore,

(C3) There is a tremor in my pocket.

(D1) There is a fault in my computer.
(D2) The computer is in my office.

Therefore,

(D3) There is a fault in my office.

Perhaps, before embarking upon the proliferation of further spatial senses of ‘in’, we should note that in all of these cases, an object is described as being in a certain state. I suggest that that is why we can’t conclude from there being a pain in my finger to there being a pain in my mouth. My proposal, no less than Tye’s, has the appeal of not introducing a special mental sense of ‘in’ for pain in X. So I’m not quite sure what is to be said in favour of his proposal.

References